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PROBING FOR HOLES IN THE 100-YEAR-OLD BASEBALL
EXEMPTION: A NEW POST-ALSTON CHALLENGE
Sam C. Ehrlich*

INTRODUCTION
It is fitting that yet another challenge to baseball’s long-derided
exemption to antitrust law would be filed just a few months before its onehundredth birthday.1 In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Federal Baseball v. National League held that professional baseball’s
business of “giving exhibitions of base ball [sic]” was “purely [a] state
affair[]” and thus outside of the Sherman Antitrust Act’s sole focus on
interstate commerce.2 On the basis of stare decisis, courts—including the
Supreme Court itself—have for the past century repeatedly applied this
antitrust exemption to baseball and refused to extend it to other sports and
related industries.3
The latest attack against the baseball exemption comes from a group of
minor league teams that were shut out of the 2021 restructuring of the
Minor League Baseball affiliate system by Major League Baseball
(“MLB”).4 In an effort to standardize the number of minor league
affiliates per major league club and dispense with the teams with facilities
seen by the major league clubs as less-than-desirable, MLB offered a
proposal in 2019 to drop the total number of affiliated minor league clubs
from 160 to 120.5 Despite significant opposition to the plan by Minor
* Sam C. Ehrlich, J.D./Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Boise State University College of
Business and Economics.
1. See Complaint, Nostalgia Partners v. Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 21-cv-10876
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 2021).
2. Federal Baseball v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922). See also United States v.
Shubert, 348 U. S. 222, 230-32 (1955) (holding that the baseball exemption does not apply to the
production of theatrical attractions and operating theaters while declining to overturn the exemption’s
applicability to baseball); United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U. S. 236, 242 (1955) (holding that the
baseball exemption does not apply to professional boxing while declining to overturn the exemption’s
applicability to baseball); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U. S. 445, 450-52 (1957) (holding that
the baseball exemption does not apply to professional football while declining to overturn the exemption’s
applicability to baseball).
3. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (holding per curiam that the baseball
exemption must continue, as the baseball business “has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the
understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 28285 (1972) (holding that while the business of baseball is squarely within the bounds of interstate
commerce, its antitrust exemption must continue as “since 1922 baseball, with full and continuing
congressional awareness, has been allowed to develop and to expand unhindered by federal legislative
action.”).
4. Complaint at 1, Nostalgia Partners, supra note 1.
5. J.J. Cooper, MLB Proposal Would Eliminate 42 Minor League Teams, BASEBALL AMERICA
(Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/mlb-floats-proposal-that-would-eliminate-42-
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League Baseball, its clubs, and various political figures,6 the plan was
implemented in late-2020, spurred by MLB’s takeover of minor league
operations and the significant losses to minor league revenue after the
2020 season was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.7
Many of the 43 teams left without affiliation agreements following the
plan’s implementation either joined MLB’s new Draft League (comprised
of draft-eligible players)8 or joined new or existing independent leagues.9
While many of those clubs opted to accept their fates, the Staten Island
Yankees, a team among those forced to fold,10 sued MLB and its former
minor-league-teams/. At the same time, MLB added three clubs that were previously with independent
leagues: the Somerset Patriots and the Sugar Land Skeeters of the Atlantic League and the St. Paul Saints
of the Northern League. Greg Tufaro, Yankees Officially Announce Somerset Patriots as Double-A
Affiliate,
BRIDGEWATER
COURIER
NEWS
(Nov.
7,
2020,
6:21
PM),
https://www.mycentraljersey.com/story/sports/2020/11/07/yankees-officially-announce-somersetpatriots-double-affiliate/6203705002/; Chandler Rome & David Barron, Sugar Land Skeeters to Become
Astros’
AAA
Team,
HOUSTON
CHRONICLE
(Nov.
16,
2020,
8:16
AM),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/texas-sports-nation/astros/article/Sugar-Land-Skeeters-to-becomeAstros-AAA-team-15732133.php; Jeff Wald, St. Paul Saints to Become Twins’ Triple-A Affiliate in 2021,
FOX9 KMSP (Dec. 9, 2020, 5:28 PM), https://www.fox9.com/sports/st-paul-saints-to-become-twinstriple-a-affiliate-in-2021.
6. See, e.g., Claire Bessette, Congressmen Urge Major League Baseball to Scrap ‘Radical’
Minor League Overhaul, THE DAY (Nov. 20, 2019, 9:57 AM), https://www.theday.com/localnews/20191119/congressmen-urge-major-league-baseball-to-scrap-radical-minor-league-overhaul.
7. See Kevin Reichard, Details of MLB Takeover of MiLB Emerge, BALLPARK DIGEST (Nov. 2,
2020), https://ballparkdigest.com/2020/11/02/details-of-mlb-takeover-of-milb-emerge/. See James
Wagner, Minor League Baseball’s Opposition to Overhaul Softens in Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 12,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/sports/baseball/minor-leagues-mlb-takeover.html.
8. Steve Melewski, Taking a Closer Look at the MLB Draft League, MASN SPORTS (Jan. 18,
2021, 8:28 AM), https://www.masnsports.com/steve-melewski/2021/01/taking-a-closer-look-at-the-mlbdraft-league.html.
9. Mark Singelais, Tri-City ValleyCats Join Frontier League for 2021 Season, TIMES-UNION
(Jan. 7, 2021, 9:09 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/sports/article/Tri-City-ValleyCats-join-FrontierLeague-for-2021-15852540.php. A few other teams, including the Burlington Bees, joined the existing
Prospect League, a collegiate summer league. See, e.g., Matt Levins, BASEBALL: Burlington Bees Join
the
Prospect
League,
THE
HAWK
EYE
(Jan.
13,
2021,
10:58
AM),
https://www.thehawkeye.com/story/sports/2021/01/13/baseball-burlington-bees-join-prospect-league
/4154812001/. Eight teams in the Pacific Northwest—including the author’s adored Boise Hawks—
remained in the previously-affiliated Pioneer League, which was designated a “partner” league by MLB.
Sam Dykstra, Pioneer League Becoming MLB ‘Partner League’, MILB.COM (Nov. 30, 2020),
https://www.milb.com/boise/news/pioneer-league-becoming-mlb-partner-league. While the clubs in the
Pioneer League are independent of any MLB club affiliation, the “partner league” designation had MLB
agree to funding the league’s initial expenses, provide scouting technology to the eight ballparks, and
create a procedure for player transfer to MLB organizations. Id. It is also likely that the “partner league”
designation also included indemnification agreements, though this is purely speculation on the part of the
author based in part on the fact that the teams invited to keep their affiliation agreements were required to
sign indemnification and non-disclosure agreements before they could even review the new Professional
Development License agreement. Evan Drellich, Angry Minor League Owners Weigh Fight with MLB,
THE ATHLETIC (Dec. 10, 2020), https://theathletic.com/2253333/2020/12/10/minor-league-ownersweigh-mlb-fight/.
10. Ken Davidoff, Staten Island Yankees Fold, File $20M Suit Against MLB, Big-League Club,
N.Y. POST (Dec. 3, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/12/03/staten-island-yankees-fold-sue-mlbny-yankees/. Also among those forced to fold were the Lancaster JetHawks, Lowell Spinners, and Jackson
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parent club (the New York Yankees) for breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, and tortious interference with contractual relations.11 The Staten
Island Yankees were then joined in January 2021 by the Tri-City
ValleyCats, who—employing the same attorneys—sued MLB and the
Houston Astros (its former parent club) on similar legal theories.12 One
year later, these two clubs—now joined by the ownership groups of the
Norwich Sea Unicorns and the Salem-Keizer Volcanos—have decided to
attack MLB on a different front: through antitrust litigation and another
perhaps quixotic quest to overturn baseball’s antitrust exemption.13
The plaintiffs and their lawyers are clearly aware of the challenges
facing their antitrust claims. On a podcast appearance shortly after the
complaint was filed, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys explained that he
knew the district and appellate courts would almost certainly dismiss the
complaint and the key issue at hand was whether the Supreme Court will
grant certiorari.14 At the same time, however, the plaintiffs argued in their
complaints (1) but for the antitrust exemption, MLB’s actions would
“warrant per se condemnation,” and (2) they have “objectively good
reasons to believe that the Supreme Court would no longer apply the
‘unrealistic,’ ‘inconsistent,’ and ‘aberration[al]’ baseball antitrust

Generals—the last of whom had a lease with the city that voided if the team could not maintain an MLB
affiliation. See Bill Shaikin, In Lancaster, MLB Promised Baseball. The City Might Prefer an
Amphitheater,
LOS
ANGELES
TIMES
(Mar.
10,
2021,
3:37
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2021-03-10/lancaster-minor-league-jethawks-rob-manfred-pecosleague; Alana Melanson, Team Gone, but Costs Remain for LeLacheur Park, LOWELL SUN (Aug. 29,
2021), https://www.lowellsun.com/2021/08/29/team-gone-but-costs-remain-for-lelacheur-park/; Adam
Friedman, Jackson Generals Not Invited to Join the New Minor League Baseball, Future is Uncertain,
JACKSON SUN (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/local/2020/12/09/jacksongenerals-werent-invited-join-new-minor-league-baseball/6503932002/.
11. Davidoff, supra note 10.
12. Daniel Kaplan, Astros, MLB Sued Over Minor League Realignment by Tri-City ValleyCats,
THE ATHLETIC (Jan. 15, 2021), https://theathletic.com/2325569/2021/01/15/astros-mlb-sued-over-minorleague-realignment-by-tri-city-valleycats/. These lawsuits have found some success thus far. While six of
the ValleyCats’ ten claims were dismissed in August 2021 and the seven of the Staten Island Yankees’
eight claims were similarly dismissed in September 2021, the remaining claims were allowed to proceed
through discovery. Michael McCann, Minor League Club Scores Win in Contraction Lawsuit, SPORTICO
(Sep.
7,
2021),
https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2021/mlb-restructuring-minor-league1234638666/ (discussing the court’s ruling in the ValleyCats litigation); Daniel Kaplan, Yankees Fail to
Dismiss Lawsuit Over Ending Affiliation with Staten Island Minor League Team, THE ATHLETIC (Sep.
10, 2021), https://theathletic.com/2817863/2021/09/10/yankees-fail-to-dismiss-lawsuit-over-endingaffiliation-with-staten-island-minor-league-team/. Discovery has already led to some interesting
revelations, including emails relaying drama between the minor league and major league clubs over the
big-league Yankees’ apparent distain for the minor-league Yankees’ notorious “Staten Island Pizza Rats”
rebranding during the 2018 season. Rich Calder, Yankees Were ‘Embarrassed’ by Staten Island Team’s
Pizza Rat Promotion, N.Y. POST (Jan. 1, 2022, 9:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2022/01/01/yankeesembarrassed-by-pizza-rat-promotion/.
13. See Complaint, Nostalgia Partners, supra note 1.
14. Mike Lawson, The Baseball Exemption: Timing is Everything, CONDUCT DETRIMENTAL
(Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.conductdetrimental.com/post/the-baseball-exemption-timing-is-everything.
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exemption if presented with a proper case for reconsidering it.”15 Legal
commentators, however, have resoundingly disagreed, with one
colorfully declaring that “[a] federal judge would dismiss this in five
minutes.”16
Importantly, the Nostalgia Partners litigation raises some interesting
points which, combined with occasional deviations of interpretation
throughout the antitrust exemption’s lifespan, could represent a small
crack in the exemption’s veneer. While these arguments are not
necessarily novel by themselves, when joined with the Supreme Court’s
recent decision refusing the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
(“NCAA”) efforts for similar antitrust immunity,17 they represent
arguably the most compelling threat to the baseball antitrust exemption in
nearly two decades.
Regardless of the plaintiffs’ arguments’ merits, the renewed effort to
overturn the baseball antitrust exemption so near Federal Baseball’s onehundredth birthday provides an excellent opportunity for a retrospective
on the history of the baseball exemption and its current standing. Despite
constant scholarly critique18 and judicial condemnation,19 the baseball
15. Complaint, Nostalgia Partners, supra note 1, at 3-4.
16. Daniel Kaplan, Four Former Minor-League Affiliates Become the Latest Legal Challengers
to MLB’s Antitrust Exemption, THE ATHLETIC (Dec. 20, 2021), https://theathletic.com
/3027965/2021/12/20/four-former-minor-league-affiliates-become-the-latest-legal-challengers-to-mlbsantitrust-exemption/ (quoting lawyer Chris Deubert).
17. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
18. See, e.g., Richard B. Blackwell, Note, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System:
Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859 (1971); Edmund P. Edmonds, Over Forty
Years in the On-Deck Circle: Congress and the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
627, 660 (1994) (arguing the baseball exemption is “a judicial aberration without justification.”); see also
Connie Mack & Richard M. Blau, The Need for Fair Play: Repealing the Federal Baseball Antitrust
Exemption, 45 FLA. L. REV. 201 (1993) (a scholarly article co-authored by a sitting U.S. Senator from
Florida (Mack) calling for a statutory repeal of baseball’s antitrust exemption); but see Gary R. Roberts,
The Case for Baseball’s Special Antitrust Immunity, 4 J. SPORTS ECON. 302, 302 (2003) (arguing that the
baseball exemption “is in the public interest”); Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust
Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 211, 215 (2012) (challenging “the prevailing scholarly consensus opposing
baseball’s historic exemption from antitrust law on policy grounds” while arguing that baseball is not
different than other sports in spite of the exemption and that the threat of revoking the exemption has
allowed Congress to wield substantial power over MLB).
19. See, e.g., Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., concurring)
(deeming Federal Baseball “an impotent zombi” [sic] worthy of repeal); Salerno v. American League of
Prof. Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970) (“We freely acknowledge our belief that Federal
Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes’ happiest days, that the rationale of Toolson is extremely
dubious and that, to use the Supreme Court’s own adjectives, the distinction between baseball and other
professional sports is ‘unrealistic,’ ‘inconsistent’ and ‘illogical.’”) Notably, such critique has even
included Supreme Court justices. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450 (1957)
(noting that the Court’s continuation of the baseball exemption in Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees was in spite of
Federal Baseball’s “dubious validity”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(deeming Federal Baseball as a “a derelict in the stream of the law”); Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Federal Baseball and Toolson “are totally at odds with more recent and better reasoned
cases”); Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2159 (noting the Court’s acknowledgement of “criticisms of [Federal
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antitrust exemption has endured over two dozen attacks through litigation
over the past century.20 This endurance has not come without its share of
bumps in the road, however, as litigators—and even the occasional
judge21—have worked against the grain in search of room to defeat or
narrow baseball’s antitrust immunity against the overwhelming snowball
effect of the exemption’s enduring stare decisis. With the Supreme
Court’s Alston decision representing yet another attempt by another sports
league to secure a baseball-like antitrust exemption,22 it is worth
discussing whether the Court’s reasoning unanimously rejecting those
arguments could perhaps portend a shifting attitude towards baseball’s
antitrust immunity as well.
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the baseball antitrust
exemption, focusing on previous attempts by litigators, judges, and
scholars to limit or constrict the exemption’s current near-absolute effect.
Part II then details the links between the baseball antitrust exemption and
the Supreme Court’s recent holding in NCAA v. Alston, arguing that the
Court’s treatment and analysis of the NCAA’s claims to antitrust
immunity in Alston could similarly apply to MLB in Nostalgia Partners.
Part III then provides a realistic look at the likelihood of those chances,
explaining the differences between the baseball antitrust exemption’s
history and the contextual circumstances of Alston that would more likely
Baseball] as ‘unrealistic’ and ‘inconsistent’ and ‘aberration[al]’”); Justice John Paul Stevens, Keynote
Address at the Sports Lawyers Association 41st Annual Conference Luncheon, at 14 (May 15, 2015),
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS_SportsLawyersAssociation_05-1515.pdf (arguing “that it simply makes no sense to treat organized baseball differently from other
professional sports under the antitrust laws”); Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., The Origin of the Baseball
Antitrust Exemption: Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 34 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 183, 193 (2009) (noting that the Federal Baseball decision “has been pilloried
pretty consistently in the legal literature since at least the 1940s.”).
20. See Sam C. Ehrlich & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Tracking the Evolution of Stare Decisis, 60 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57, 85 (2021) (finding 26 cases as part of the “Federal Baseball citation network” as
having applied antitrust law to legal issues involving professional baseball).
21. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 435-38 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that
the baseball exemption is limited to the reserve clause); Butterworth v. Nat. League, 644 So. 2d 1021,
1023-25 (Fla. 1994) (adopting the reasoning of Piazza); Minnesota Twins P’ship v. State by Humphrey,
1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 72, 136 (Minn. Dist. 1998), reversed, Minnesota Twins P’ship v. State, 592
N.W. 2d 847 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied, Hatch v. Minn. Twins, 528 U.S. 1013 (1999) (same); Morsani
v. Major League Baseball, 663 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing a trial court’s dismissal of
an antitrust claim against MLB, noting that “[t]he trial judge below did not have the benefit of the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision which . . . held that federal and state antitrust laws applied to decisions involving
sales and locations of baseball franchises, and that the antitrust exemption for baseball extended only to
the reserve system”); Laumann v. National Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 291-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(holding that the baseball exemption does not apply to baseball’s television broadcasting contracts as “a
subject that is not central to the business of baseball, and that Congress did not intend to exempt.”).
22. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2159 (“To be sure, this Court once dallied with something that looks a
bit like an antitrust exemption for professional baseball . . . But this Court has refused to extend Federal
Baseball's reasoning to other sports leagues—and has even acknowledged criticisms of the decision as
‘unrealistic’ and ‘inconsistent’ and ‘aberration[al].’”).
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doom Nostalgia Partners’ chances before they start.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHALLENGES TO THE BASEBALL
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Baseball’s antitrust exemption remains one of the most controversial
quirks of law generally and as it relates to sports specifically.23 The
baseball antitrust exemption was established in Federal Baseball v.
National League,24 a 1922 Supreme Court decision which held that
professional baseball, as a business of “giving exhibitions of base ball
[sic]” involves “purely state affairs” and thus cannot be held to the
requirements of the Sherman Antitrust Act.25 As the Sherman Act—a
federal law passed through the Constitution’s Commerce Clause—applies
to “trade or commerce among the several States[] or with foreign
nations,”26 after the Federal Baseball ruling, federal courts could not
regulate the professional baseball industry for cartels, collusion, or
monopolies as they could with other industries.27
Not long after Federal Baseball was decided, some lower court judges
began criticizing the decision as improper. In 1949, Judge Jerome Frank
of the Second Circuit argued in a concurrence that recent Supreme Court
decisions expanding the scope of the Commerce Clause had “completely
destroyed the vitality” of Federal Baseball, and therefore, the court had
cause to ignore Federal Baseball to find that the reserve clause binding
players to teams indefinitely should be deemed “within the prohibitions
of the Sherman Act.”28
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court heard two cases by other sports
leagues arguing that they should be given the same exemption.29 On both
occasions, however, the Court refused to grant the other sports leagues

23. See, e.g., Grow, supra note 18, at 212 (noting that scholars have “derided [the exemption] as
‘inexplicable and indefensible,’ ‘illogical,’ ‘irrational,’ and ‘anachronistic’” while other scholars have
“gone even further” and described the exemption as “a ‘judicial embarrassment’ and an “archaic
reminder[] of judicial decision making at its arthritic worst,’ as well as a ‘grotesque legal anomaly’ and
an ‘arrogant testament to stubborn ignorance’”) (citations omitted).
24. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
25. Id. at 208-09. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1-2 (1890). See also generally
NATHANIEL GROW, BASEBALL ON TRIAL: THE ORIGIN OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION (2014)
(detailing the origins of the baseball exemption through a detailed analysis of the factors that led to the
Federal Baseball decision and arguing that despite historical criticism, the Federal Baseball decision was
in fact correct for its time).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
27. See Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 405-406 (2d Cir. 1949) (discussing the limited power
of the Sherman Act in light of the Federal Baseball decision).
28. Id. at 410 (Frank, J., concurring).
29. U.S. v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss4/4

6

Ehrlich: Probing for Holes in the 100-Year-Old Baseball Exemption: A New P

1178

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

similar deference. The Supreme Court in United States v. International
Boxing Club reversed a lower court ruling that the business of boxing
clubs were exempt from the Sherman Act under Federal Baseball, finding
that the Court in Federal Baseball had ruled merely that baseball was
exempt, not “all businesses based on professional sports.”30 Similarly, in
Radovich v. National Football League (NFL), the Court found that “the
volume of interstate business involved in organized professional football
places it within the provisions of the [Sherman] Act” and held
professional football outside of the scope of the baseball antitrust
exemption while striking down an NFL rule that bound players to their
teams.
At the same time, there were a few judicial deviations from Federal
Baseball within the baseball antitrust exemption’s first half-century of
existence. In 1946, the Second Circuit in Gardella v. Chandler31 ruled
that MLB’s actions banning a former New York Giants player who broke
his contract to play in Mexico must be held within of the scope of the
Sherman Act despite Federal Baseball precedent, ordering a full trial on
the merits.32 This decision was made with some unease by the three ruling
judges, who, in an unusual move, each filed opinions expressing their
thoughts on the course of action, with the dissenting judge writing first.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Harrie B. Chase identified the thenrecent explosion of commercial influence in professional baseball,
including the fact that the clubs had recently begun to “sell for valuable
consideration the right to broadcast play-by-play descriptions of the
games over the radio and thus across state lines”—an observation that
clearly implicated interstate commercial aspects of professional
baseball.33 While Judge Chase noted the recent trend of decisions “show
a wide reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause when
Congress chooses to exert it,” he wrote that Federal Baseball itself “has
never been expressly overuled [sic]” and felt that it had not been overruled
“by necessary implications” by the cases expanding the Commerce
Clause.”34
Conversely (and colorfully), Judge Jerome Frank, in his concurring
opinion, wrote that the Supreme Court’s expansion of the Commerce
Clause had “left [Federal Baseball] but an impotent zombi [sic],” and
while he wrote that they should not attempt to completely overrule it, he
felt that the current case could be distinguished from Federal Baseball

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 242-43.
172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id. at 405 (Chase, J., dissenting).
Id. at 404 (Chase, J., dissenting).
Id. at 404-05 (Chase, J., dissenting).
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due to the reserve clause’s “shockingly repugnant” characteristics.35 In a
third, more-rationed approach, Chief Judge Learned Hand wrote that, in
his view, it was clear that based both on the expansion of the commercial
aspects of professional baseball and the expansion of the Commerce
Clause that MLB’s actions concerned interstate commerce.36 However,
he felt that the Court should not pass any judgment on the legality of the
reserve clause until after a full trial.37
What is important about these three opinions is none of the three judges
on the panel felt that Federal Baseball was still good law—they merely
disagreed as to how exactly the court should handle that reality in the
instant case. Judge Chase in dissent felt that Federal Baseball must still
operate as precedent until the Supreme Court explicitly overturns it.38
Chief Judge Hand and Judge Frank, on the other hand, wrote that Federal
Baseball could either be treated as overruled sub silentio39 or simply
distinguished based on differing facts,40 respectively.
Unfortunately, Gardella never reached a full trial or received a
definitive decision on the legality of the reserve clause, as MLB settled
with Gardella and the other Mexican League defectors shortly
thereafter.41 While the Second Circuit had another opportunity later in
1949 to revisit the issue, Judge Hand had since somewhat retreated from
his previous position against Federal Baseball’s viability.42 He wrote
instead for a unanimous panel holding that while the court should follow
Gardella, the court should still affirm the district court’s order denying a
preliminary injunction—they were “not prepared to say that . . . the
‘reserve clause’ violates the Anti-Trust Acts,” thereby paradoxically

35. Id. at 408-09 (Frank, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 407-08 (Hand, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. (Hand, C.J., concurring).
38. Id. at 405 (Chase, J., dissenting) (arguing “there is no actual decision so incompatible with
that in Federal Base Ball Club v. National League . . . as to displace the latter by mere weight of its
authority.”).
39. Id. at 408 (Hand, C.J., concurring) (“[W]e are wasting our time over the Baseball case[,] for
it was overruled sub silentio.”).
40. Id. at 408-09 (Frank, J., concurring) (writing that while “it seems best that this court should
not [] hold” that the baseball exemption has been completely overturned, “there is no longer occasion for
applying these earlier cases beyond their exact facts.”).
41. Ron Briley, Danny Gardella and Baseball’s Reserve Clause: A Working-Class Stiff
Blacklisted in Cold War America, 19 NINE: J. BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE 52, 63-64 (2010).
42. Martin v. National League, 174 F.2d 917, 918 (2d Cir. 1949). This panel consisted of the same
judges who had decided Gardella with one notable exception: Judge Chase, the dissenter in Gardella, had
been replaced by Judge Swan. The turnaround from Gardella by Judge Frank was not altogether
unsurprising (despite the fact that he referred to Federal Baseball as an “impotent zombi[e]”), as he did
write in a footnote in Gardella that his conclusion on Federal Baseball’s lack of continued viability was
reached “somewhat hesitantly” as “the Supreme Court has never explicitly overruled the Federal Baseball
Club case.” Gardella, 172 F.2d at 409 n.1 (Frank, J., concurring).
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following both Gardella and Federal Baseball.43
And either way, the Supreme Court would shortly thereafter put to rest
the Second Circuit’s deviations in the 1956 opinion Toolson v. New York
Yankees,44 which held in a single-paragraph, per curiam opinion that the
baseball exemption must be maintained on the basis that “Congress has
had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such
business under these laws by legislation having prospective effect.”45
With that in mind, the Supreme Court reasoned, baseball had “been left
for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to
existing antitrust legislation,” and thus any changes to that status should
be made by legislation, rather than by court ruling.46
While Federal Baseball’s rationale or continued viability could
continue to be debated, Toolson nonetheless represented a firmer
statement by the Supreme Court that the baseball antitrust exemption
should be left intact. Toolson would be relied on several times within the
next few decades, including by the Second Circuit in Salerno v. American
League,47 a case involving a dispute between the league and two umpires
who had attempted to form a union.48 The Second Circuit would continue
its tradition of strongly critiquing the baseball exemption, writing that
“Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes’ happiest days, that
the rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious and that, to use the Supreme
Court’s own adjectives, the distinction between baseball and other
professional sports is ‘unrealistic,’ ‘inconsistent’ and ‘illogical.’”49
However, the panel acknowledged that they were bound by Toolson’s
continuation of the exemption, noting that “the Supreme Court should
retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions.”50
Two years after Salerno, the Supreme Court affirmed the baseball
antitrust exemption’s continued viability in Flood v. Kuhn.51 The manner
by which the Court in Flood affirmed the exemption, however, created
significant turmoil over the next several decades. In fact, this turmoil
started in some ways with the Flood opinion itself, which in affirming the
baseball exemption, did so in a way that in the eyes of some later courts
left more questions than answers. The reason for this confusion is
partially because Flood—unlike Toolson before it—spent ample time in

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Martin, 174 F.2d at 918.
346 U.S. 356 (1953).
Id. at 357.
Id.
429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1005 (quoting Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
Id.
407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972).
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its majority opinion citing previous authority, including not only Federal
Baseball and Toolson, but also other lower court decisions like Martin,
Salerno, and even Gardella.52
Interestingly, in mentioning Gardella, Flood did not make an explicit
judgment as to the merits of Gardella’s holding; it instead cited Gardella
merely as a counterexample to the idea that most cases challenging the
baseball exemption had been unsuccessful.53 In a strange way, however,
the Flood opinion would in some ways ultimately mirror the reasoning of
Gardella’s panel. Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion held that it was
now “appropriate” to say that “[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it
is engaged in interstate commerce”: a prime foundational takeaway from
the Gardella majority.54 Still, Flood did not take the step that Gardella
took in distinguishing or overturning Federal Baseball, instead finding
“the aberration” of Federal Baseball was “an established one, and one
that has been recognized not only in Federal Baseball and Toolson, but
in Shubert, International Boxing, and Radovich, as well, a total of five
consecutive cases in this Court.”55 As such, Flood mirrored Toolson by
retaining the baseball exemption on the grounds of stare decisis but
differed substantially from Toolson by taking away the factual
foundations of Federal Baseball.
This distinction would become important in subsequent baseball
antitrust exemption litigation because later cases tried to significantly
narrow the scope of the exemption’s effect. These attempts started soon
after Flood in the 1978 Seventh Circuit case Finley v. Kuhn.56 While
Finley’s citation of Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood—along with
the exemption in general—was positive, the Seventh Circuit majority
briefly addressed the plaintiff’s argument that “any exemption which
professional baseball might enjoy from federal antitrust laws applies only
to the reserve system” due to Justice Blackmun’s specific pinpoint of the
reserve clause throughout the Flood opinion.57 The court dismissed this
argument, writing that:
Despite the two references in the Flood case to the reserve system, it
appears clear from the entire opinions in the three baseball cases . . . that
52. Id. at 272.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 282. Gardella, 172 at 407-08 (Hand, C.J., concurring) (arguing that baseball’s “relation
to broadcasting and television” means that it engages in interstate commerce); Id. at 412 (Frank, J.,
concurring) (“I conclude, then, that here there is substantial interstate commerce of a sort not considered
by the Court in the Federal Baseball case.”). Judge Chase’s dissent would disagree with this notion,
writing that the plaintiff’s “services, or ability to work, are not subjects of trade or commerce within the
anti-trust acts.” Id. at 406 (Chase, J., dissenting).
55. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
56. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
57. Id. at 540.
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the Supreme Court intended to exempt the business of baseball, not any
particular facet of that business, from the federal antitrust laws.58

Within this passage, the Seventh Circuit also included a footnote
observing that the baseball exemption “does not apply wholesale to all
cases which may have some attenuated relation to the business of
baseball.”59 To support this contention, the court cited Twin City
Sportservice v. Finley,60 a case that involved an antitrust dispute between
an MLB club and a concessionaire but did not cite any baseball exemption
case or even discuss it at all.61
The Finley court ultimately felt that the facts of Twin City Sportservice
were distinguishable from those in in the instant case and thus upheld the
baseball exemption’s applicability.62 But just a few years later, Twin City
Sportservice would be joined by another case that completely disregarded
the baseball exemption and Federal Baseball despite being a baseball
antitrust case. This case, Fleer v. Topps Chewing Gum,63 found that the
MLB Players Association’s exclusive licensing agreements with Topps
for the use of player images on baseball cards was not an unreasonable
restraint of trade, without relying on the baseball exemption in defense.64
Twin City Sportservice and Fleer would then collectively help lead to
the first successful challenge to the then-boundless scope of the baseball
exemption since Toolson: Henderson Broadcasting v. Houston Sports.65
Henderson Broadcasting involved a dispute between a radio broadcast
company and the Houston Astros after the Astros cancelled their
broadcasting agreement with the radio broadcast company in favor of a
new exclusive deal with another broadcaster.66 Predictably, the Astros
relied exclusively on the baseball exemption in their motion to dismiss
the antitrust claims.67
However, the Southern District of Texas found that the baseball
exemption did not apply.68 Amazingly, this decision was based on a
comparison between Flood and Gardella. The court argued that since
“[t]he question of the effect of broadcasting on the baseball exemption
was left unresolved because Gardella was settled without further
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 541.
Id. at 541 n. 51.
Id.
Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F. 2d 1264, 1268-70 (9th Cir.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Finley, 569 F.2d at 540-41.
658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
Id.
Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n., 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 265-69.

1975).
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proceedings,” the Supreme Court’s “consistent refusal to extend the
exemption to other professional sports, in part because of the interstate
broadcasting of the sports” was “evidence of the narrow scope of the
Supreme Court’s judicially created baseball exemption.”69 Disputing the
notion that Flood—through its reliance on Congressional inaction—
preserved the baseball exemption wholesale, the court found that
Congress “clearly ha[d] not extended the exemption to cover other
businesses related to baseball.” Rather, Congress “ha[d] recognized that
professional organized sports are involved in extraneous business
activities and expressed its judgment that an extension of the baseball
exemption to other activities as well as to other sports would contravene
the federal antitrust laws.”70
This analysis rested on Congress’s passage of the Sports Broadcasting
Act of 1961 (“SBA”), which had provided to the various professional
sports—including baseball—an exemption to the antitrust laws for any
collective sale of broadcast rights of the league’s member clubs.71 Noting
the SBA’s inclusion of baseball within its scope, the Southern District of
Texas argued that “Congress ha[d], contrary to the court’s observations
in Flood v. Kuhn, focused on the question of exemption of the television
broadcast of sports from the antitrust laws and ha[d] legislated with regard
to baseball no differently than it ha[d] with regard to football, basketball
and hockey.”72 Since Congress had only exempted over-the-air television
broadcasting in this matter and not radio broadcasting, the Henderson
Broadcasting court held that “there is no reason to believe Congress
intended to exempt radio broadcasting of baseball from those laws.”73
However, the Henderson Broadcasting court went further than simply
carving out a hole for radio broadcasting. Citing Finley’s notion that the
exemption “does not apply wholesale to all cases which may have some
attenuated relation with the business of baseball,” and the two baseball
antitrust cases that did not discuss the exemption, Twin City Sportservice
and Fleer, the court disagreed with MLB’s vision of unlimited antitrust
immunity.74 Instead, it held that “[t]he baseball exemption arose and has
been applied by the courts solely in disputes between players and team
owners or a league” and that “in antitrust actions involving contracts
69. Id. at 267-68.
70. Id. at 269.
71. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1291, overruling United States v. National Football League, 196 F.
Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Chicago Pro. Sports Ltd. P’ship v. National Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667,
670-72 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining the scope and limitations of the antitrust exemption created by the
SBA).
72. Henderson Broadcasting, 541 F. Supp. at 269.
73. Id. at 269-70.
74. Id. at 270 (citing Charles O. Finley & Co. Inc., v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978)
(internal quotation omitted)).
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between baseball teams or players on the one hand, and non-exempt
business enterprises on the other, no court has granted a dismissal on the
ground that baseball is somehow implicated.”75
The Henderson Broadcasting litigation continued several years after
that opinion, but its holding rejecting the baseball exemption’s coverage
of baseball broadcasting rights appears to have never been appealed or
otherwise addressed by the district court or the Fifth Circuit on appeal.76
Throughout the 1990s, however, this narrow view of the baseball
exemption would be echoed and even extended in a few other notable
cases.
The first of these cases, Postema v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs,77 involved a female National League umpire claiming
that, while working as an umpire in the minor leagues, she was subject to
continuous sexual harassment and ultimately fired as an umpire because
of her gender in violation of New York state law prohibiting illegal
restraints of trade.78 On the antitrust claim—a relatively minor part of the
lawsuit compared to the plaintiffs’ Title VII and equivalent state law
gender discrimination claims—the National League claimed that the
baseball exemption fully exempted their conduct from New York state
antitrust scrutiny.79 However, the Southern District of New York did not
accept this argument, holding instead that the baseball exemption was
narrowly tailored in a way that did not include league-umpire relations.80
Using Flood, the Postema court articulated a new rule defining the
baseball exemption’s scope: if, according to Flood, the baseball
exemption “rests on a recognition and acceptance of baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs,” then “conduct not touching on those
characteristics or needs” might not be exempt from liability.81 The court’s
rationale was premised on a strict review of the facts of Federal Baseball,
Toolson, and Flood, finding that the Supreme Court “ha[d] not

75. Id.
76. See Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 647 F. Supp. 292, 297 (S.D. Tex.
1986) (granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s per se antitrust claims while denying
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the overall claims on the grounds that additional
evidence beyond expert witness testimony as to market share is necessary to sustain a Sherman Act § 1
or § 2 analysis); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 659 F. Supp. 109, 111-112 (S.D.
Tex. 1987) (finding the defendants did not have the monopoly power to sustain a § 2 claim and that there
was no sustainable breach of contract claim, thereby dismissing the lawsuit.). Neither of those two
opinions brought back the baseball exemption defense levied by the Astros. To the author’s knowledge
based on examination of the docket and keyword searches, the case was never heard by—nor even
appealed to—the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
77. 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 1478-80.
79. Id. at 1486.
80. Id. at 1489.
81. Id. at 1488 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972)).
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specifically determined whether the exemption applies to baseball’s
conduct outside the domain of league structure and player relations.”82
The Postema court then cited Henderson Broadcasting and three cases
that did not mention the baseball exemption (Fleer, Twin City
Sportservice, and a third, Nishimura v. Dolan)83 as examples where courts
either explicitly or implicitly found that the baseball exemption did not
apply to certain conduct outside of activity deemed particularly
responsive to “baseball’s unique characteristics.”84 Defining its rule for
the baseball exemption’s scope, the court then wrote that its role in this
case was to “determine whether baseball’s employment relations with its
umpires are ‘central enough to baseball to be encompassed in the baseball
exemption.’”85
All of these cases led to one important judicial breakthrough in the fight
to narrow the baseball exemption: the 1992 decision by Judge John
Padova of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Piazza v. MLB.86 Piazza
was a challenge filed by a group of businessmen looking to purchase the
San Francisco Giants and move them to Florida but were denied the right
to do so by MLB.87 While the plaintiffs in Piazza acknowledged that
82. Id.
83. 599 F. Supp. 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that allegations that the defendant acted to obtain
exclusive cable broadcast rights to several New York-based sports teams—including the MLB Yankees
and Mets—was not enough to sustain a viable antitrust claim).
84. Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1488-89 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 282 (2d Cir. 1971)).
85. Id. (citing Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n., 541 F. Supp 263, 265
(S.D. Tex. 1982)).
86. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Judge Padova is mentioned specifically here because this
would amazingly not be the last time that he would make an against-the-grain finding that caused turmoil
within a sports league. Judge Padova would pen a set of decisions nearly 30 years later declaring that a
group of college athletes could proceed with their lawsuit against their schools and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) based on the theory that there is an employment relationship between
intercollegiate athletes—including those not in so-called revenue sports—their schools, and the NCAA.
Johnson v. NCAA, No. 19-cv-05230, 2021 WL 3771810 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2021) (finding that the athleteplaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleges that they were employees of their attended schools); Johnson v.
NCAA, No. 19-cv-05230, 2021 WL 4306022 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 22, 2021) (finding that the athlete-plaintiffs’
complaint plausibly alleges that the NCAA’s relationship with college athletes rises to the level of joint
employer status). The enduring impact of this decision remains to be seen, as Judge Padova granted the
attended schools’ motion to appeal, sending to the Third Circuit the question of “[w]hether NCAA
Division I student athletes can be employees of the colleges and universities they attend for purposes of
the Fair Labor Standards Act solely by virtue of their participation in interscholastic athletics.” Johnson
v. NCAA, No. 19-cv-05230, 2021 WL 6125095 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2021).
87. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 422-23. At the time this opinion was filed, lead plaintiff Vincent
Piazza’s son, Mike, was wrapping up his first full season in MLB with the Los Angeles Dodgers. See
Mark T. Gould, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: The Pitch Gets Closer and Closer, 5 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 273, 283 n. 38 (1995); Minnesota P’ship v. State, 592 NW 2d 847, 855 n. 17 (Minn. 1999);
NICK FRIEDMAN, BASEBALL SUPERSTARS: MIKE PIAZZA 45-46 (2007). The younger Piazza would win
the National League Rookie of the Year, providing a strong start to his career with the Dodgers, Florida
Marlins (briefly), New York Mets, San Diego Padres, and Oakland Athletics that would eventually lead
to his induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame. See Anthony McCarron, Mike Piazza Documentary Shows
Progression from Minor-Leaguer Who Almost Quit the Game to Mets Star, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jul. 13,
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Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood “recognize some form of
exemption from antitrust liability related to the game of baseball,” they
argued that “the exemption either does not apply in this case, cannot be
applied as a matter of law to the facts of this case, or should no longer be
recognized at all.”88 In sum, as Judge Padova noted, the plaintiffs argued
that the exemption was confined to the specific circumstances of the
reserve clause while MLB “argue[d] that the exemption applies to the
‘business of baseball’ generally, not to one particular facet of the game.”89
According to Judge Padova, MLB’s “expansive view” of the baseball
exemption had been correct—but the scope of the baseball exemption had
been fundamentally and severely limited by the Flood decision.90 While
Judge Padova did not dispute that Flood was binding precedent, he argued
that Flood—by “stripp[ing] from Federal Baseball and Toolson any
precedential value those cases may have had beyond the particular facts
there involved, i.e., the reserve clause”—had implicitly overturned those
two cases and retained the scope of the exemption only to the specific and
narrow context that Flood was deciding.91 As such, he found Federal
Baseball and Toolson to no longer be binding precedent, and the baseball
exemption could thus not be applied to the present, non-reserve clause
facts.
Judge Padova did entertain MLB’s argument of a “different reading of
Flood,” which he noted relied primarily on Finley v. Kuhn.92 However,
he argued that the Seventh Circuit—and MLB by implication—simply
read Flood incorrectly.93 Finley v. Kuhn, according to Judge Padova, had
inaccurately applied the doctrine of stare decisis by failing to consider
that Flood merely created “result stare decisis” rather than “rule stare
decisis.”94 Judge Padova argued that in Flood, “the Supreme Court
exercised its discretion to invalidate the rule of Federal Baseball and
Toolson,” and as such “no rule from those cases binds the lower courts as
a matter of stare decisis.”95 As such, Federal Baseball and Toolson no
longer needed to be followed; only Flood and its specific findings
regarding the exemption’s applicability on the reserve clause specifically
defined the scope of the exemption.96
2016), https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseball/mets/piazza-doc-takes-viewer-almost-quitter-metsstar-article-1.2709764.
88. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 433.
89. Id. at 435.
90. Id. at 435-36.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 436-37.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 438.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Judge Padova then turned to other case law—including Postema—that
had “defined the exempted market (characterized as the ‘business of
baseball’) as that which is central to the ‘unique characteristics and needs’
of baseball.”97 While Judge Padova agreed with the reasoning of these
cases generally, he felt that they could be distinguished.98 None of these
cases had “analyzed or applied the expansive view of the baseball
exemption to the market for ownership issues in existing baseball teams,”
and therefore they were useful only to inform the prior analysis of the
exemption.99 Since he felt that these ownership issues were “not central
to the unique characteristics and needs of exhibiting baseball games,”
Judge Padova felt his decision conformed with prior case law and
provided a narrower reading of the baseball exemption post-Flood.100
Not every court agreed with Piazza’s interpretation of baseball
exemption case law, even in the years closely following the decision. In
New Orleans Pelicans Baseball v. National Leagues101—another case
involving the potential relocation of a team, though this time in the minor
leagues—the Eastern District of Louisiana agreed with the defendants’
arguments “assert[ing] that Piazza is out of step with years of federal
jurisprudence and is nothing more than a wrongly decided case.”102
Similarly, in McCoy v. MLB,103 the Western District of Washington took
a different view of the scope of the exemption as articulated in Toolson
and Flood, writing that Flood had “repeated” Toolson’s statement of the
scope of the baseball exemption as the entirety of “the business of
baseball.”104 The McCoy court disagreed with the Piazza reasoning,
writing that it had ignored Flood’s closing paragraph which had “broadly
state[d] its holding” that ‘Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.’”105
However, one year after Piazza, the Florida Supreme Court adopted
the exceedingly narrow view of the baseball exemption in Butterworth v.
97. Id. at 440 (quoting Postema v. National League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475,
1488 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
98. Id. at 440-41.
99. Id.
100. Id. It should be noted that following this decision MLB moved for an interlocutory appeal on
the question of whether the baseball exemption is limited to the reserve clause. See Piazza v. MLB, 836
F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Judge Padova rejected this motion and denied leave for MLB to appeal,
writing that while “[t]he nature and extent of Baseball’s antitrust exemption may be a controlling issue of
law” that had “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” the grant of an appeal would risk substantial
delay and the prospect of “multiple trials with multiple appeals.” Id. at 271-73.
101. New Orleans Pelicans Basketball, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Pro. Baseball Leagues, Inc. No.
93-253, 1994 WL 631144 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994).
102. Id. at *8-9.
103. 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
104. Id. at 457 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (emphasis removed)).
105. Id. (quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 285).
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National League,106 a case involving Florida Attorney General Robert
Butterworth’s investigation of antitrust issues surrounding the same
proposed sale and move of the Giants as in Piazza. The lower courts ruled
in favor of MLB, quashing the investigation on the ground that the
baseball exemption preempted such investigations.107 However, the
Florida Supreme Court evidently found Piazza’s rationale convincing,
calling the opinion “a thorough analysis of what this rejection of the
analytical underpinnings of Federal Baseball means to the precedential
value of Federal Baseball and Toolson.”108 The Florida Supreme Court
found that while there was “no question that Piazza is against the great
weight of federal cases regarding the scope of the exemption,” none of
the other cases had “engaged in such a comprehensive analysis of Flood
and its implications.”109 Instead, the court found, these cases had “simply
state[d] that baseball is exempt and cite[d] to one or more of the baseball
trilogy without any discussion at all.”110
But the divergence created by Piazza and Butterworth would not last
long. In 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act, a revision of the
Sherman Act that purported to limit the scope of the baseball
exemption.111 But instead of overturning the baseball exemption in its
entirety, the Curt Flood Act merely repealed the baseball antitrust
exemption in relation to disputes “directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level,”112 while keeping the exemption for all other cases involving
the business of baseball, including franchise ownership and relocation
issues, minor league baseball player employment issues, the marketing
and sale of professional baseball products, and the exploitation of
intellectual property rights.113
As Professor Grow noted in 2016, the Curt Flood Act was peculiar in
its “opposite structure” compared to other pieces of legislation.114 Grow
observed that while most bills “devote the bulk of their text to setting forth
whatever policy change the law is intended to achieve . . . of the 1,002
words of the Curt Flood Act, 73 describe what the legislation does; the

106. Butterworth v. National League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
107. Id. at 1022.
108. Id. at 1024.
109. Id. at 1025 (citing Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974);
Pro. Baseball Schs. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1086 (11th Cir. 1982)).
110. Id.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(1-6).
114. Nathaniel Grow, The Curiously Confounding Curt Flood Act, 90 TUL. L. REV. 859, 860
(2016).
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other 929 words discuss what the Act does not do.”115 Grow wrote that
most scholars, and even some judges, have noted that contrary to
Congress’s goal of limiting the exemption through the Curt Flood Act,
the Curt Flood Act actually “either explicitly codified the rest of
baseball’s exemption or, at a minimum, reflected congressional
acquiescence in broad-based antitrust immunity for the sport.”116 It can
even be argued, according to Grow, that Congress actually strengthened
the exemption by codifying several topic areas where the baseball
exemption still applied while including a broad ‘catch-all’ provision
stating that the Curt Flood Act does not “create, permit or imply a cause
of action” for “any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons not
in the business of organized professional major league baseball.”117 All
of this was despite Congress’s assertions that the Curt Flood Act would
“bring[] the rule of antitrust law to baseball.”118
Drawing a similar conclusion, Professor Edmonds argued that the Curt
Flood Act in fact had no positive effect.119 While the Curt Flood Act

115. Id.
116. Id. at 861; Id. at 861 n. 10.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 26b; § 26b(6). Based on the Flood Act’s arguable expansion of the baseball
exemption, it could be said that one of the only cases limiting the scope of the baseball exemption, Twin
City Sportservice v. Finley, 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975), is now either an anomaly or would be decided
differently if it were heard again today. In Twin City Sportservice, the Ninth Circuit did not even consider
the baseball exemption in ruling that the Oakland Athletics’ antitrust counterclaim against stadium
concessionaires had properly identified illegal anti-competitive effects. Id. at 1275. Twin City Sportservice
was later distinguished on two separate occasions (both after the passage of the Flood Act): in City of San
Jose v. Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F. 3d 686, 690 (9th Cir. 2015), where the Ninth Circuit held
that only activities that are “wholly collateral to the public display of baseball games” are untouched by
the baseball exemption; and in Right Field Rooftops v. Chicago Cubs, 87 F. Supp. 3d 874, 885 (N.D. Ill.
2015), aff’d, 870 F. 3d 682 (7th Cir. 2017), where a district court within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction
followed the San Jose rule and found that selling tickets to watch Chicago Cubs games from nearby
building rooftops was “central to the ‘public display of baseball games.’” Of note, it has not seemed to
matter to the courts that the baseball organization in Twin City Sportservice was the plaintiff (by means
of a counterclaim) instead of the alleged violator of antitrust law; in fact San Jose merely cited Twin City
Sportservice to stand for the proposition that “[not] all antitrust suits that touch on the baseball industry
are barred.” City of San Jose, 776 F. 3d at 690. See also Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 n. 51 (7th Cir.
1978) (citing Twin City Sportservice in noting that “[w]e recognize that this exemption does not apply
wholesale to all cases which may have some attenuated relation to the business of baseball.”). Indeed, the
Texas-based district court cited Twin City Sportservice in Henderson Broadcasting to defend not applying
the baseball exemption to an antitrust claim by a broadcast company against the owners of MLB’s Houston
Astros, arguing that “[i]f the contract of a concessionaire, whose programs, advertising and food are part
of the spectators’ experience of the baseball game, is not covered by the baseball exemption, then neither
should the broadcasting contract which provides transmission of merely an aural version of the game
across the airwaves.” Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 270
(S.D. Tex. 1982). In present day, it is difficult to find much difference in “central[ity]” to baseball between
selling tickets to watch baseball games and selling broadcasting rights or concessions to fans at baseball
games. Id.; Twin City Sportservice, 512 F.2d at 1275; Right Field Rooftops, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 885.
118. Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REV. 747, 748 (2009).
119. Edmund P. Edmonds, The Curt Flood Act of 1998: A Hollow Gesture After All These Years?,
9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 315, 317 (1999).
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allowed baseball players to “join basketball and football players in their
ability potentially to wage antitrust war against management,” the
nonstatutory labor exemption, which exempts collectively bargained
terms from antitrust scrutiny, had been strengthened enough where “the
nonstatutory labor law exemption will nearly always trump a complaint
predicated upon antitrust grounds.”120 Edmonds’s argument is buoyed by
the Curt Flood Act’s clause holding that the Act shall not “be construed
to affect the application to organized professional baseball of the
nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.”121
These arguments have largely been confirmed by baseball antitrust
exemption case law since the Curt Flood Act’s passage. Failed attacks on
the exemption since 1998 have included opinions that referred directly to
the Curt Flood Act as having “explicitly preserved the [baseball]
exemption.”122 Using this baseball-friendly interpretation of the Curt
Flood Act as guidance, the majority of the more recent baseball
exemption opinions have remained faithful to a broad interpretation of the
baseball exemption without so much as a second thought.123
For example, in City of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball,124 a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel wrote that the exemption
covers anything involving “the business of providing public baseball
games for profit between clubs of professional baseball players.”125
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Wyckoff v. Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball126 declined to “adopt a narrower reading of baseball’s antitrust
exemption” due to “the binding precedent from the Supreme Court and
from this Circuit, and the limited exception created by Congress in the
[Curt Flood Act].”127 Finally, while the Seventh Circuit in Right Field
Rooftops v. Chicago Cubs128 acknowledged that “[the] exemption does
not apply wholesale to all cases which may have some attenuated relation
to the business of baseball,” even the activity of blocking apartment
rooftop views of Wrigley Field with signage was “part and parcel of the
‘business of providing public baseball games for profit’ that Federal
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(d)(4).
122. Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 n. 12 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
123. But see Laumann v. National Hockey League, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 292-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(holding that the ‘blacking out’ of team games from nationwide broadcasting packages within a specific
home territory to promote local broadcasting deals was not covered by the baseball exemption, finding
instead that Congress explicitly held game broadcast rights to be actionable under antitrust laws by another
statute granting a limited antitrust exemption to sports teams—the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.) The
potential opening created by Laumann is discussed infra notes 151-162 and accompanying text.
124. 776 F. 3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015).
125. Id. at 690 (quoting Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953)).
126. 705 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2017).
127. Id. at 29.
128. 870 F. 3d 682 (7th Cir. 2017).
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Baseball and its progeny exempted from antitrust law.”129 None of these
cases cited Piazza, Butterworth, or any other case that had previously
limited the scope of the exemption. Despite petitions for certiorari being
filed in each of these cases, the Supreme Court refused to revisit their
previous holdings on each occasion.130
II. COULD ALSTON PORTEND A NEW ATTITUDE ON THE BASEBALL
EXEMPTION’S CONTINUED VIABILITY?
A. Alston, Circuit Splits, and the post-Flood Act Baseball Exemption
Of course, each of the opportunities that the Supreme Court has had to
revisit the baseball antitrust exemption came before its summer 2020
holding in NCAA v. Alston.131 In Alston, the Supreme Court was faced
with a question similar to the one it faced in Toolson and Flood: whether
it should continue granting judicial deference to a sports league (in this
case the NCAA) on grounds that had not been extended to any other sports
league.132 Just as MLB has relied on Federal Baseball’s stare decisis as
having birthed the baseball exemption, the NCAA relied in Alston on
language from the Supreme Court’s holding in the 1984 case NCAA v.
Board of Regents,133 which noted the NCAA’s “critical role in the
maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” and
thus called for courts to grant them “ample latitude to play that role.”134
Leading up to the Supreme Court’s Alston review, several courts had
treated the Board of Regents decision to grant the NCAA “ample latitude”
in a way that one group of scholars deemed a “quasi-exemption” from
antitrust exposure—not granting total antitrust immunity, but certainly
granting immunity on key issues related to the NCAA’s vision of
129. Id. at 689.
130. See City of San Jose v. Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015); Wyckoff v. Off.
of the Comm’r of Baseball, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018); Right Field Rooftops v. Chicago Cubs, 138 S. Ct.
2621 (2018) (each denying certiorari). See also Miranda v. Selig, 138 S.Ct. 507 (2017) (also denying
certiorari following an appeal from the Ninth Circuit by a group of minor league baseball players alleging
wage fixing by MLB and its clubs).
131. 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2159 (2021)
132. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2020) (No. 20-512) (framing
the issue by distinguishing the Ninth Circuit holding under appeal from those in other circuits that
“properly read this Court’s precedent to mean that NCAA rules designed to prevent student-athletes from
being paid to play receive deference under the rule of reason and should be upheld without trial and fact
intensive analysis.”).
133. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
134. Id. at 120. See also Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157-58 (discussing this language and the NCAA’s
reliance on it to argue against “any rule of reason review in this suit.”). Ironically, the NCAA actually lost
in Board of Regents, as the Court found that their output restrictions of television broadcast rights in
college football “has restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s
life.” Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
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amateurism.135 The most blatant example of this was by the Seventh
Circuit, which cited the Board of Regents language to hold that:
[W]hen an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant to maintain the “revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports” or the “preservation of the student-athlete
in higher education,” the bylaw will be presumed to be procompetitive,
since we must give the NCAA “ample latitude” to play that role.”136

In this regard, for the next 37 years the Board of Regents language
compelled judges to grant the NCAA an exceedingly wide degree of
“ample latitude” to a level far exceeding even the baseball exemption’s
wide scope. Indeed, leading up to Alston, the Board of Regents “ample
latitude” language had spread beyond antitrust law, insulating the NCAA
and its stakeholders by granting them a surprisingly wide degree of
latitude in a wide variety of different legal theories, including in:
- Claims of age discrimination;137
- Claims that certain NCAA rules are arbitrary and capricious;138
- Disputes on the extent of states’ powers to dictate how the NCAA
“enforces its rules and regulates the integrity of its product;”139

135. Thomas A. Baker III et al., Debunking the NCAA’s Myth That Amateurism Conforms with
Antitrust Law: A Legal and Statistical Analysis, 85 TENN. L. REV. 661, 673 (2018).
136. Agnew v. national Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 342-43 (7th Cir. 2012). See also
Brief for Professor Sam C. Ehrlich as Amicus Curiae, Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2020) (Nos. 20-512; 20520), 2020 WL 6802302 at *9-20 (discussing the Agnew language and other similar language as having
granted implied immunity to the NCAA from antitrust law).
137. Butts v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.2d 609, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming a
denial of a preliminary injunction in a case involving a student-athlete’s claim that an NCAA bylaw
counting each year of participation in high school sports after turning 20 years old as a year of eligibility
was age discrimination, stating that the NCAA’s interests in “thwart[ing] ‘professionalism’ in college
sports” are strong enough to support denying the injunction).
138. Bloom v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (noting
the Supreme Court’s recognition in Board of Regents of the NCAA “as ‘the guardian of an important
American tradition,’ namely, amateurism in intercollegiate athletics” in finding that a football studentathlete who was suspended for receiving money in relation to his corresponding career as a professional
skier and model failed to prove that the NCAA was acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner in
promulgating and enforcing its amateurism bylaws). See also Hispanic College Fund v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 826 N.E.2d 652, 656-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Board of Regents’s
discussion of the NCAA as a voluntary organization in finding that an arbitrary and capricious challenge
to an NCAA rule requiring organizations sponsoring preseason football games to apply for exemptions
was nonreviewable because the plaintiff voluntarily joined the NCAA).
139. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F. 3d 633, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming
a district court opinion finding that a Nevada statute imposing procedural due process requirements on
the NCAA was a violation of the dormant commerce clause, as the district court’s finding that “in order
for the NCAA to accomplish its goals, the ‘enforcement procedures must be applied even-handedly and
uniformly on a national basis’” is not only correct, but is consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement
in Board of Regents “that the integrity of the NCAA’s product cannot be preserved ‘except by mutual
agreement; if an institution adopted [its own athlete eligibility regulations] unilaterally, its effectiveness
as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed’”) (quoting National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (D. Nev. 1992); Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102).
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Calculations of tort damages for college athlete plaintiffs;140
Determinations of the profitability of university sports as necessary
for elements of state tort claims;141
- Attacks on the NCAA’s non-profit status for the purpose of
exemption from state property taxes;142 and
- Claims that college athletes should be considered employees of
their schools under federal wage and hour law.143
A large part of the argument by the NCAA (and this author as amicus
curiae) that the Supreme Court grant certiorari in Alston was that the
Ninth Circuit’s unwillingness to grant such extreme deference created a
circuit split with the Seventh Circuit.144 While the Supreme Court did not
directly address this circuit split in its decision, the effect of its holding
-

140. Marcantonio v. Dudzinski, 155 F. Supp. 3d 619, 635 n. 16 (W.D. Va. 2015) (applying the
Supreme Court’s discussion of amateurism in Board of Regents as means to justify a conclusion that
“college athletic scholarships and participation in collegiate athletics are not cognizable property
interests” and cannot be considered a “pecuniary business interest” for the purposes of calculating tort
damages.) Interestingly, in that same footnote the Western District of Virginia also sharply disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit’s labeling of Board of Regents’s discussion of amateurism rules as mere dicta in
O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F. 3d 1049, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2015), stating that
“[w]hile somewhat vogue to characterize that language as dictum, . . . that view is incorrect” since “the
statement in Board of Regents was necessary to the Supreme Court’s analysis and resulting conclusion
that NCAA rules should not be subjected to per se antitrust scrutiny.” Marcantonio, 155 F. Supp. 3d at
635 n. 16. One wonders if this decision might be decided differently now that the Supreme Court itself
has declared the language in question to be dicta. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
141. Williams v. Smith, Nos. 27-CV-09-16611, 27-CV-07-22194, 2010 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 115,
at *17-18 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 8, 2010) (noting the statements in Board of Regents, other cases, and
scholarly works as evidence that “[t]he NCAA and member schools earn significant revenues from their
basketball programs” to find that the first factor of a negligent misrepresentation claim against
governmental organizations under Minnesota law—”whether government derives a profit from the
function”—weighs in favor of a finding that an intercollegiate basketball program is a proprietary
operation and thus can be sued under that claim).
142. Nat’l Collegiate Realty Corp. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 236 Kan. 394, 401-03 (Kan.
1984) (discussing the Supreme Court’s then-recent findings in Board of Regents to determine whether the
NCAA and its real estate holding company subsidiary should be considered an “educational institution”
for the purposes of a Kansas state tax exemption for educational institutions).
143. Berger v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F. 3d 285, 292 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that
the Supreme Court’s articulation of “a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” serves also to
“define[] the economic reality of the relationship between student athletes and their schools” thus
necessitating a finding that student-athletes are not employees of their schools). See also Dawson v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407-08 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d on other grounds,
932 F. 3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting the plaintiff’s attempts to use the Ninth Circuit’s characterization
of the relationship between the NCAA and student athletes in O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F. 3d 1049, 1074
(9th Cir. 2015), as ‘labor for in-kind compensation’ which suffices to establish an employment
relationship under [the] FLSA,” and instead writing that “[t]o the contrary, the [O’Bannon] decision notes
the Supreme Court’s own description of the college football market as ‘a particular brand of football’ that
draws from ‘an academic tradition’”).
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 132, at 16 (“The decision below thus entrenches an
acknowledged circuit conflict on the important and recurring issue of how the rule of reason applies to
NCAA eligibility rules”); Brief for Professor Sam C. Ehrlich as Amicus Curiae, supra note 136, at 6 (“The
presently appealed case should be heard by this Court to correct that circuit split and reaffirm this Court’s
longstanding heavy presumption against implicit exemptions’ to the antitrust laws.”).
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sided with the Ninth Circuit, finding the Board of Regents “ample
latitude” language to be dicta.145 And while the specific effect of the
Supreme Court’s Alston mandate was narrow—merely affirming the
district court’s injunction forbidding the NCAA from capping universities
from “offer[ing] enhanced education-related benefits”— the broader
effect of adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning will almost certainly have
much broader implications in years to come: including removing the
Board of Regents “quasi-exemption” from the NCAA’s arsenal.146
One could conceivably apply the reasoning of Alston in rejecting the
NCAA’s “quasi-exemption” to the baseball exemption. The Supreme
Court’s opportunity to revisit and reshape the NCAA’s purported “quasiexemption” grew from a circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits regarding how to interpret the Supreme Court’s directive in
Board of Regents and the degree of “ample latitude” that should be
granted to the NCAA when faced with challenges to their amateurism
rules. Piazza and Butterworth present a similar disagreement regarding
courts’ interpretation of the baseball exemption, even though these two
cases alone do not rise to the level of the clear circuit split that existed
before Alston. The narrower, reserve clause-focused reading of the
baseball exemption adopted by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
Florida Supreme Court in Piazza and Butterworth, respectively, exists as
an alternative interpretation to Flood similar to the Ninth Circuit’s reading
in Board of Regents, which did not find wider NCAA antitrust immunity.
While most judges have interpreted the Curt Flood Act as having wiped
away Piazza and Butterworth, not all courts have agreed. After the Curt
Flood Act’s passage, two district court opinions carried on Piazza’s and
145. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157-58. See also Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(removing all doubt to this question by noting that the unanimous majority opinion “makes clear that the
decades-old ‘stray comments’ about college sports and amateurism made in [Board of Regents] were dicta
and have no bearing on whether the NCAA’s current compensation rules are lawful.”).
146. Baker et al., supra note 135, at 673. See also, e.g., Sam C. Ehrlich, The NCAA’s Massive Loss
in Alston, Explained, EXTRA POINTS (June 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/BLL5-38DS (explaining the impact
of the Supreme Court declaring the Board of Regents “ample latitude” language to be dicta in Alston).
This prophesy has already borne fruit in the fields of employment and labor law. A Pennsylvania district
court has cited Alston’s as having “rejected the NCAA’s argument that Board of Regents ‘expressly
approved its limits on student-athlete compensation—and [that] this approval forecloses any meaningful
review of those limits today’” to justify a holding that college athletes can be deemed employees under
federal wage and hour law. Johnson v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 19-cv-05230, 2021 WL
3771810, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2021). One month later, the general council National Labor Relations
Board cited Alston in a memo arguing that private school college athletes should be allowed unionization
rights under the National Labor Relations Act, writing that the Supreme Court in Alston had “recognized
that amateurism in college sports has changed significantly in recent decades and rejected the notion that
NCAA compensation restrictions are ‘forevermore’ lawful.” N.L.R.B. Guidance Mem. 21-08 at 5 (Sept.
29, 2021), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/memos-research/general-counsel-memos. See also
Sam C. Ehrlich, A Three-Tiered Circuit Split: Why the Supreme Court Was Right to Hear NCAA v. Alston,
J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 43 n.248) (discussing the “enormous
ramifications on the landscape of college sports” delivered by the Alston holding).
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Butterworth’s legacy, albeit to a much smaller and less impressive
magnitude.
The first of these decisions involved a spin-off of the Butterworth
litigation.147 There, the Northern District of Florida in a footnote
disagreed with MLB that the Curt Flood Act “constitute[d] an
endorsement by Congress of the exemption of the business of baseball,”
instead “tak[ing] Congress at its word [that] ‘[n]o court shall rely on the
enactment of this section as a basis for changing the application of the
antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than’
player issues.”148 As such, the court decided to “resolve this case without
reliance on the Curt Flood Act as affecting the outcome one way or the
other.”149 Within those guidelines, the court still held that “the business
of baseball is exempt [as] the exemption was well established long prior
to adoption of the Curt Flood Act and certainly was not repealed by that
Act.”150
While that first district court decision did not stray too far from the rest
of the baseball exemption jurisprudence—only rejecting the idea that the
Curt Flood Act had strengthened the exemption—the second district court
diverted itself from that line of case law to a greater extent. Laumann v.
National Hockey League151 involved an antitrust challenge by a group of
hockey and baseball fans of the leagues’ blackout rules for internet-based
broadcasts of games.152 In the opinion, which largely mirrored the
holding of another challenge to the placement of broadcast rights disputes
within the baseball exemption’s scope, Henderson Broadcasting v.
Houston Baseball,153 the Southern District of New York found that the
‘blacking out’ of team games from nationwide broadcasting packages
147. Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001), aff’d, Major
League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F. 3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003).
148. Id. at 1331 n. 16 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 27a(b)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 56 F. Supp. 3d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). This case has a strange procedural history, particularly
in relation to the parties: the NHL, not MLB, was the sole defendant in Laumann, but MLB (through the
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball) was a defendant in the related Garber v. Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball, a case that was decided alongside Laumann by the court but, at the same time,
specifically not consolidated into the same case. See Order at 2, Laumann v. NHL, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Nos. 12-cv-1817; 12-cv-3704), ECF No. 82 (noting that “the Laumann and Garber
actions are not consolidated” despite the parties jointly filing briefs and a motion to dismiss). Despite this,
the cited Laumann opinion—rather than any opinions captioned in the Garber litigation—is the only
opinion in either case to discuss the baseball exemption’s applicability on the merits. But see Garber v.
Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 120 F. Supp. 3d 334, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denying MLB’s individual
motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal on the grounds that there is no “substantial ground for
difference of opinion” on the scope of the baseball exemption and that the prior ruling denying application
of the baseball exemption is not “contrary to existing law”).
152. Laumann, 56 F.Supp.3d at 285-86.
153. 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982). See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
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within a specific home territory to promote local broadcasting deals was
explicitly actionable under antitrust laws due to the SBA’s inclusion of
baseball within its language.154 According to the court, “the language and
structure of the SBA suggests that, as of 1961, Congress understood sports
broadcasting agreements to fall outside the baseball exemption” since the
inclusion of baseball within the scope of this Act “would be meaningless
if all baseball broadcasting agreements were already covered by the
common law exemption.”155
Moreover, the Laumann court explicitly rejected MLB’s attempt to
“argue that the Curt Flood Act reveals a congressional consensus that
sports broadcasting agreements are covered by the baseball exemption,”
rejecting the use of a Congressional Budget Office cost estimate that had
suggested the Act would “retain the antitrust exemption for a variety of
topics, including . . . ‘broadcast rights.’”156 To this end, the court wrote
that it would be “a tenuous inference that Congress considered
broadcasting exempt simply because ‘sales of the entertainment product
of organized professional baseball’ and ‘licensing of intellectual property
rights’ were included in a long list of topics that would remain unchanged
by the Act.”157
The Laumann court’s holding in this specific circumstance plainly
creates what can only be termed as an extremely narrow gap within the
overall scope of the exemption, especially because the litigation would
settle before trial.158 However, the court’s reading that the Curt Flood Act
“did not alter the applicability of the antitrust laws” for anything other
than the “employment of major league baseball players” could pointedly
154. Laumann, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 292-94. The “nationwide broadcasting packages” referred to in
the context of Laumann are the MLB.tv and MLB Extra Innings packages, which exclude in-market games
to ‘avoid diverting viewers from local RSNs that produce the live game feeds that form the OOM
packages.’” Id. at 288. The effect of this limitation is vast and has been repeatedly criticized as overbroad;
in fact, one study found that due to the often broad drawing of home markets, some regions have up to six
teams “blacked out,” which causes consumers in that area to have as much as 35 percent of all MLB
games in a given season “blacked out” due to these restrictions. Jeremy Frank (@MLBRandomStats),
Twitter (Apr. 20, 2019 11:40 AM), https://twitter.com/MLBRandomStats/status/1119627015160848384.
See also, e.g., Benjamin Burroughs & Adam Rugg, Extending the Broadcast: Streaming Culture and the
Problems of Digital Geographies, 58 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 365, 369-70 (2014) (explaining
blackout rules and how those rules have led to an increase in digital piracy of sports broadcasts); John A.
Fortunato, Sports Leagues’ Game Exposure Policies: Economic and Legal Complexities, 3 J. GLOBAL
SPORT MGMT. 1 (2019) (discussing the sports league broadcasting business model and several cases where
broadcast blackouts have been challenged under antitrust law).
155. Laumann, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 295.
156. Id. at 296.
157. Id. at 297 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)-(b)(3)).
158. See William F. Saldutti IV, Note, Blocking Home: Major League Baseball Settles Blackout
Restriction Case; However, a Collision with Antitrust Laws in Still Inevitable, 24 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L. J. 49 (2017) (discussing the effect of Laumann post-settlement but arguing that the combination
of Laumann’s judicial findings and settlement terms still leaves an opening for future antitrust litigation
challenging MLB’s still-surviving blackout policies).
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narrow the rule, because that interpretation of the Act would leave intact
any case law decided before the Act’s passage that held any of baseball’s
actions as unexempted, including Piazza and Butterworth.159
Such a positioning of the Curt Flood Act has had powerful supporters.
In a 2015 keynote address at the Sports Lawyers Association’s annual
conference, former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens argued that
the Act was “abundantly clear,” explaining that “it simply makes no sense
to treat organized baseball differently than other professional sports under
the antitrust laws” and criticized the exemption’s application to the thenrecently decided City of San Jose case.160 However, Justice Stevens went
a step further, expressing that not only did the Curt Flood Act leave in
place prior deviations but that it actually “overruled the Supreme Court
decision in [Flood]” by rejecting the stare decisis rationale in Flood and
Toolson.161
Furthermore, no less of an authority than former MLB commissioner
Bud Selig expressed similar reservations about the continued viability of
Laumann’s rejection of the Curt Flood Act’s broader scope in a law
review article with Marquette University Law School professor Matthew
Mitten. Selig and Mitten wrote that “Laumann’s narrow construction of
baseball’s antitrust exemption . . . may inhibit MLB and its clubs from
making procompetitive business decisions necessary to maintain on-field
competitive balance or that otherwise are consistent with consumer
welfare.”162 Although Laumann settled before trial, Selig and Mitten
argued that the court’s pre-settlement ruling still limits the scope of the
exemption.163
159. Laumann, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 294.
160. Justice John Paul Stevens, supra note 19, at 14.
161. Id. at 13. Unfortunately for baseball exemption critics, Justice Stevens never had a chance to
rule on a baseball exemption case during his tenure on the Court, which began in 1975—just one year
after Flood—and ended with his retirement in 2010. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens, Who Led Liberal Wing, Dies at 99, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 16, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/07/16/us/john-paul-stevens-dead.html.
162. Allan H. Selig & Matthew J. Mitten, Baseball Jurisprudence: Its Effects on America’s Pastime
and Other Professional Sports Leagues, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1171, 1187-89 (2019).
163. Id. at 1189. At the same time, the continued power of the Laumann precedent does come with
some questions. In an April 2019 letter to MLB commissioner Rob Manfred requesting the production of
documents related to MLB’s potential purchase of local broadcasting stations from the Walt Disney
Company, Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD) stated that the potential purchase “raises significant questions
about the antitrust exemption that professional baseball has enjoyed for nearly a century” as MLB’s
potential expansion into broadcasting “could increase the risk of anticompetitive conduct that harms
American consumers and, in tum, baseball itself.” Letter from Rep. Elijah Cummings, Chairman, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Rob Manfred, Commissioner, Major League Baseball (Apr. 11,
2019), at 1-2, available at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
2019-04-11.EEC%20RK%20to%20Manfred-MLB.pdf. While Cummings discussed Laumann in his
letter, he dismissed its impact, noting that the case eventually settled. Id. at 2. Cummings’s threat of
imposing “additional limits on the league’s antitrust exemption” in this letter perhaps signifies that
Cummings felt that the Laumann opinion and its narrow carveout into the baseball exemption for
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As such, the Supreme Court could conceivably have grounds to declare
(1) Piazza and Butterworth’s much more limited interpretation was the
correct reading of Flood; and (2) the Curt Flood Act, by merely leaving
the non-labor-related portions of the baseball exemption ‘as is’, did not
overrule Piazza and Butterworth’s alternate interpretation.
B. Shifting “Market Realities”: From College Sports to
Professional Baseball
The Nostalgia Partners plaintiffs certainly have looked to Alston as
their guide in their quest for Supreme Court review and revision of the
baseball exemption. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the
Supreme Court in Alston “signaled its willingness to reconsider the
application and scope of the baseball exemption recognized in Federal
Baseball” due to the unanimous Court’s decision that “sports leagues are
subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act like every other business.”164
As the plaintiffs pointed out, the Court did address the baseball
exemption in the Alston majority opinion, citing it as an example of when
the Court “once dallied with something that looks like an antitrust
exemption for professional baseball.”165 However, the Court noted that it
“has refused to extend Federal Baseball’s reasoning to other sports
leagues and has even acknowledged criticisms of the decision as
‘unrealistic’ and ‘inconsistent’ and ‘aberration[al].’”166 According to the
Nostalgia Partners plaintiffs, this signals “objectively good reasons to
believe that the Supreme Court would no longer apply the ‘unrealistic’
and ‘inconsistent’ and ‘aberration[al]’ baseball antitrust exemption if
presented with a proper case for reconsidering it.”167
Directly addressing the Piazza deviation in their complaint, the
plaintiffs made an express comparison between their litigation and Alston,
where Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood mirror Board of Regents as
“decades-old rulings articulating . . . special treatment” that the Court
“would not adhere to” because “the factual predicates do not apply.”168
An important point to this complaint is the Supreme Court’s comment in
Alston noting “little doubt that the market realities [of college sports] have
changed significantly since [Board of Regents]” and how those changes
broadcasting rights was disposed after the settlement, though the citation of Laumann by the Southern
District of New York in a later case may indicate that it is still good law. Id. at 2. See, e.g., Wyckoff v.
Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 211 F. Supp. 3d 615, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Laumann as an indistrict case that “concluded that Flood narrowed the scope of the baseball exemption”).
164. Complaint, Nostalgia Partners, supra note 1, at 3.
165. Id. at 4 (quoting NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2159 (2021)).
166. Id. (quoting Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2159) (internal citations omitted)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 28.
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bely a changed approach “[g]iven the sensitivity of antitrust analysis to
market realities.”169 Implicitly comparing the two markets, the Nostalgia
Partners complaint wrote that baseball had also experienced significant
growth and change and that “[w]hatever argument there was at the time
of Flood to adhere to such an exemption for player restrictions under
principles of stare decisis in 1984, there is no basis to apply such
principles to an unrelated restraint on competition in a different
market.”170
There is indeed little question that the market realities of professional
baseball have shifted significantly since Flood in similar fashion to how
the market realities in college sports have shifted since Board of Regents.
As evidence of the changed market realities of college sports since 1984,
the Supreme Court in Alston pointed to two shifts: first, the NCAA having
“dramatically increased amounts and kinds of benefits schools may
provide to student-athletes”; and second, the NCAA having substantially
increased revenues, where Division I football and basketball jumped from
$922 million and $41 million respectively in 1985 to a combined $13.5
billion in 2016.171
In similar fashion, professional baseball has also seen increased
benefits afforded to its athletes and drastically increased revenues since
Flood. An example of the former comes directly from Flood itself, as
Flood was a challenge to baseball’s reserve clause, a contractual provision
which confined players to the club that had them under contract and gave
clubs the ability to renew that contract unilaterally.172 Inclusion of this
clause within players’ contracts became standard practice within a matter
of years after professional baseball’s founding. By the 1890s, every
player’s contract included such a clause, and MLB instituted rules
requiring uniform contracts—and thus uniform use of the reserve
clause—by the time of the Flood challenge.173 The effect of this collusion
was substantial. Rodenberg and Lovich noted that “from the 1900s
through the 1960s, [MLB] player salaries realized little appreciation in

169. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2158.
170. Complaint, Nostalgia Partners, supra note 1, at 29.
171. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2158.
172. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 n.1 (1972). See also Robert A. McCormick, Baseball’s
Third Strike: The Triumph of College Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 113638 (1982) (describing the reserve clause and its justifications).
173. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & Justin M. Lovich, Reverse Collusion, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT.
191, 195 (2013). As Rodenberg and Lovich note, the reserve clause was created during a period of
immense instability in professional baseball during the late 1800s; teams were created, moved between
cities, and dissolved within just a few years’ span, and players within the labor market were unrestricted
and free to “contract jump” between teams at a moment’s notice whenever another team would offer more
money or a better overall deal. Id. at 194-95. The reserve clause was instituted in order to quell this
instability. Id.
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real dollars, while club owners became increasingly wealthy.”174
While players’ antitrust challenges to the reserve clause failed in both
Toolson and Flood, antitrust law was not the only weapon in the players’
arsenal. At the time of Flood, there was a movement both in practice and
scholarship that within the context of labor rights, antitrust law could, and
perhaps should, be seen as subservient to the growing field of labor law.175
However, the players union—the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA)—was still nascent in the few years immediately
preceding and following Flood, having just been formed and approved by
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 1969 after other failed and
delayed attempts. The players union’s first work stoppage came just a few
months before the Supreme Court released its Flood decision.176
Despite MLB’s unwillingness to eliminate the reserve clause through
collective bargaining, three years after Flood, the players finally found
victory through favorable contract interpretation in labor arbitration. In
1975, star pitchers Andy Messersmith of the Atlanta Braves and Dave
McNally of the Montreal Expos filed for grievance arbitration against the
clubs claiming that the clubs’ insistence on including and enforcing the
reserve clause in their contracts was illegal collusion under the MLB
collective bargaining agreement and that the reserve clause’s actual legal
effect only allowed clubs to renew the contract for one additional year.177
Shockingly—and despite around seven decades of the clause’s prior
effect as evidence to the contrary—appointed arbitrator Peter Seitz
agreed, ruling that while contract law did not prevent parties from creating
perpetual contracts, such terms that granted perpetual renewal must be
expressly drafted and could not be implied.178 As such, Seitz ruled that
Messersmith and McNally were free agents and were thus free to
174. Id. (citing ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 4-7 (2d ed. 1994)).
175. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE LAW J. 1, 6-7 (1971) (arguing that the thenongoing Flood litigation was “a case of the right teams playing the wrong game in the wrong arena,” as
the proper question “is no longer whether professional sports are entitled to a special exemption from the
antitrust laws where their employment relationships are involved, but whether unions of professional
athletes are entitled to special help from the courts and Congress in bargaining with their employers.”).
176. McCormick, supra note 172, at 1151-53. Federal Baseball had served as a barrier to
unionization as well as antitrust during the MLBPA’s first attempts at gaining NLRB approval; a 1946
decision by the labor board had held that the player’s union could be afforded no protection under the
National Labor Relations Act based on Federal Baseball’s holding that professional baseball was not
interstate commerce. Id. at 1152. This decision was indirectly reversed in 1969 when the NLRB approved
the MLBPA’s collective bargaining status. Id. See American League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B.
190 (1969).
177. McCormick, supra note 172, at 1155. See also Roger Abrams, Arbitrator Seitz Sets the
Players Free, BASEBALL RESEARCH J. (Fall 2009), https://sabr.org/journal/article/arbitrator-seitz-setsthe-players-free/.
178. McCormick, supra note 172, at 1155-56.
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negotiate with whatever team or teams they chose.179
MLB strongly objected to this decision; indeed, MLB commissioner
Bowie Kuhn quickly dismissed Seitz as an arbitrator, saying that he had
“visions of the Emancipation Proclamation dancing in his eyes.”180
However, both a district court and the Eighth Circuit found that Seitz
acted within the bounds of his jurisdiction, as defined by the collective
bargaining agreement, thus rejecting MLB’s challenge.181 MLB was left
with the only option of engaging with the MLBPA in collective
bargaining to try and renew the reserve clause as previously constructed,
an offer which the MLBPA—now invigorated with a massive amount of
bargaining leverage—would predictably reject.182 This led to a player
strike that cost baseball some of the 1981 and 1982 seasons and,
eventually, a ratified collective bargaining agreement in 1982 that
contained a reserve clause—but only for a player’s first few years in the
big leagues.183
The implementation of free agency led to an explosion in player
salaries in the next few decades and immense power and leverage for the
MLBPA in future collective bargaining negotiations with MLB. The
average MLB player salary soared quickly once free agency began,
jumping from $29,303 in 1970 to $185,000 in 1981.184 This rapid
ascension reached its peak (so far) in 2017 at $4.45 million before dipping
for three consecutive years to $4.17 million in 2021.185
This rapid increase in baseball player compensation since the Supreme
Court’s last review of the baseball exemption could be seen as parallel to
the rapid increase in college athlete compensation cited by the Supreme
Court in Alston to show “that the market realities [in the sport] ha[d]
changed significantly” since Board of Regents.186 Similarly, baseball’s
revenue sharply increased as well. The league’s total television revenue

179. Id.
180. Abrams, supra note 177.
181. See generally Kansas City Royals v. MLBPA, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
182. McCormick, supra note 172, at 1158.
183. See generally Abrams, supra note 177. The system created by the 1982 collective bargaining
agreement preserves the reserve clause for a player’s first six years, though after two-plus years the player
is entitled to raises each year determined through neutral arbitration based on his performance up to that
point. Id. This system has been kept in place as-is through the 2021 MLB season, though it has been
discussed as a potential point of modification in the forthcoming new collective bargaining agreement.
See, e.g., Roland Blum, MLB Lockout Talks to Resume with Union Counteroffer, NBC CHICAGO (Jan. 21,
2022), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/sports/mlb-lockout-talks-to-resume-with-union-counteroffer
/2733095/.
184. Paul D. Staudohar & Edward M. Smith, The Impact of Free Agency on Baseball Salaries, 13
COMPENSATION REV. 46, 48 (1981).
185. Average MLB Salary at $4.17 Million, Down 4.8% from 2019, ESPN.COM (Apr. 16, 2021),
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/31270164/average-mlb-salary-417-million-48-2019.
186. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158 (2021).
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at the time of the Flood decision in 1972 was, adjusted for inflation to
2022 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, approximately $274
million.187 Since then, television revenue in MLB has been split between
local and national deals, where local deals were estimated at a combined
$2.1 billion in 2020188 with an additional $1.7 billion per year between
their national television deals with ESPN, Turner Broadcasting, and Fox
Sports.189 These facts suggest similar circumstances to those presented in
Alston that could lead the Supreme Court to—based on “the sensitivity of
antitrust analysis to market realities”—revisit the baseball exemption in
the near future.190
III. WHERE THE ALSTON-NOSTALGIA PARTNERS
COMPARISON BREAKS DOWN
Unfortunately for those who wish to see the baseball exemption
overturned—including the Nostalgia Partners plaintiffs—there are
several strong differences between the current state of the baseball
exemption and the circumstances leading up to Alston that would discount
many of the facts offered above. While the merits of the plaintiffs’ case
are certainly compelling, but for the baseball exemption, it seems like a
tremendous reach to assume that Alston signaled the Supreme Court’s
willingness to finally abandon the baseball exemption after one hundred
years of leaving it be.
Even if one were to point to the radically different makeup of the Court
since it last debated the baseball exemption fifty years ago in Flood, most
of the current members of the Court have had several opportunities to
revisit the baseball exemption. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan were all on the Court when City of
San Jose—another case dealing with franchise ownership and
relocation—was denied certiorari in 2015.191 Justice Gorsuch, who
personally cited Federal Baseball as an example of “distinguished”
187. Michael J. Haupert, The Economic History of Major League Baseball, ECON. HISTORY
ASSOC. (2007), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-major-league-baseball/. The cited
article has MLB’s total television revenue at $41.09 million in 1972 dollars, translating to $176 million
in 2002 dollars (the adjusted value used in the article). Id. This value was calculated in 2022 dollars using
the CPI Inflation Calculator located at https://www.in2013dollars.com/, which had been last updated on
January 12, 2022.
188. Craig Edwards, Let’s Update the Estimated Local TV Revenue for MLB Teams, FANGRAPHS
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://blogs.fangraphs.com/lets-update-the-estimated-local-tv-revenue-for-mlb-teams/.
189. Craig Edwards, MLB Isn’t Losing TV Revenues Yet, FANGRAPHS (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://blogs.fangraphs.com/mlb-isnt-losing-tv-revenues-yet/.
190. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2158.
191. City of San Jose v. Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015) (denying certiorari).
While Justice Thomas would have been on the Court at the time of a Piazza or Butterworth appeal, neither
case had a petition for certiorari filed.
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precedent that the Court has “chosen to retain the holding itself” despite
“long since rejecting the reasoning” in a concurrence while with the Tenth
Circuit,192 joined the Court in time for its denial of certiorari in the minor
league baseball salary case Miranda v. Selig as well as the twin denial of
certiorari in Wyckoff v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and Right
Field Rooftops.193 Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and the newlyconfirmed Justice Jackson have yet to have a baseball exemption-related
petition for certiorari cross their desk.194
A much more critical difference, however, is simply the general status
of the judicial precedent that the Nostalgia Partners plaintiffs seek to
overturn. In Alston, the circumstances surrounding the infamous “ample
latitude” language from Board of Regents found to be mere dicta made it
easy for the Supreme Court to declare it as such. In fact, the lower courts’
opinions in Alston were largely premised on the Ninth Circuit’s rejection
of the Board of Regents “ample latitude” language in the previous
O’Bannon v. NCAA,195 where the court wrote that “[t]he Court’s long
encomium to amateurism, though impressive-sounding, was . . . dicta” as
192. Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1150 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). Indeed, within this same aside Justice Gorsuch wrote that “Congress has since codified
baseball’s special exemption,” citing the Curt Flood Act as Congressional approval and endorsement. Id.
While it is of course possible that Justice Gorsuch could be convinced otherwise upon closer analysis (or
even has already sine changed his mind), this writing certainly suggests until proven otherwise that he
would not be receptive to the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs.
193. Miranda v. Selig, 138 S. Ct. 507 (2017); Wyckoff v. Off. of the Comm’r of Baseball, 138 S.
Ct. 2621 (2018); Right Field Rooftops v. Chicago Cubs, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018) (all denying certiorari).
194. Of note, however, Justice Kavanaugh might be the justice best suited to advocate for review
and rule in favor of a narrowly defined exemption. On the former point, Justice Kavanaugh is well-known
to be a sports fan, and some have speculated that this could lead to greater interest in sports-related cases
from the Court while he is on the bench. See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson & Jordan S. Rubin,
Kavanaugh’s Sports Fandom Shines in Athlete-Centered Opinion, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jun. 23, 2021),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/kavanaughs-sports-fandom-shines-in-athlete-centeredopinion. On the latter point, Justice Kavanaugh’s passionate Alston concurrence against the NCAA’s
claim to antitrust immunity would be exactly the energy challengers to the baseball exemption would need
to have a chance at the baseball exemption similarly being overturned or narrowed. See NCAA v. Alston,
141 S. Ct. 2141, 2167-69 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). At the same time, however, Justice
Kavanaugh’s fervent rebuttal of the NCAA’s arguments in his Alston concurrence were couched entirely
within a clear distaste of the “textbook antitrust problem” of “price-fixing labor” and “the NCAA’s
decision to build a massive money-raising enterprise on the backs of student athletes who are not fairly
compensated.” Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Such a moral dispute would not apply in Nostalgia
Partners, as the plaintiffs are minor league team owners, not players. Perhaps Justice Kavanaugh would
advocate for the Court’s hearing of a case like Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017)—a case
involving price-fixed minor league baseball players—but Nostalgia Partners is not that case. And while
there has been another recently-filed case that does involve minor league compensation, that case does
not directly seek to overturn or narrow Federal Baseball through differing interpretations of Flood but
instead claims that the baseball exemption generally and the Curt Flood Act specifically are
“unconstitutional as a violation of minor leaguers’ constitutional right to equal protection of the laws,”
which is a very different conversation. See Complaint at 22-23, Concepcion v. Off. of the Comm’r of
Baseball, No. 22-cv-01017 (D.P.R. Jan. 11, 2022).
195. 802 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
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compensation rules like those challenged in O’Bannon (and Alston) “were
not before the Court.”196 Rather than dealing with anything concerning
college athlete compensation, Board of Regents concerned a challenge to
the NCAA’s stranglehold on its schools’ television broadcast rights, and
the NCAA lost this case.197 The Court in Regents mentioned the NCAA’s
amateur character only twice: first, in finding that the challenged
television plan did not “fit into the same mold” as those rules defining
“the eligibility of the participants,”198 and second, in writing the nowinfamous concluding plea for the NCAA to be granted “ample latitude”
to play its “critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports”—even while finding that the rule in the
instant case was “hardly consistent with this role.”199
Piazza presents a similar baseball exemption-focused argument that
could have been made in Nostalgia Partners: since Flood only addressed
the reserve clause, any language within its opinion that purported to
expand the exemption beyond those facts would be dicta, since—to
paraphrase O’Bannon—the exemption’s application to the business of
baseball outside of labor relations “w[as] not before the Court.”200 But
the context of Flood makes this is a much weaker claim to dicta treatment
than the argument in front of the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon and the
Supreme Court in Alston. The NCAA’s claim to antitrust immunity in
Alston was based on “stray comments” made by the Court in a totally
unrelated case,201 and Alston stood as the first attempt by the Court to
clarify those comments.202 By contrast, the question faced by the Court
in Flood was whether to retain a significantly more well-established
exemption forged through two prior Supreme Court holdings and targeted
196. Id. at 1063.
197. See generally NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (finding that the NCAA’s
television plan restricting broadcasts to one game per week unreasonably restrained output in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
198. Id. at 117-120.
199. Id. at 120. An interesting note for the purposes of this Article is that the author of the Board
of Regents majority opinion—and as such the quoted plea for judicial deference to NCAA actions—was
Justice John Paul Stevens, who, as noted earlier, is very much on record as being staunchly against
baseball’s antitrust exemption and in line with more narrow reads of the Flood decision and Curt Flood
Act. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
200. O’Bannon, 802 F. 3d at 1063.
201. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158 (2021).
202. The Supreme Court had previously rejected petitions for certiorari in several NCAA antitrust
amateurism cases prior to Alston, but its simple disinterest in hearing a case before Alston cannot be
compared to its affirmative decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson to affirmatively establish and
confirm baseball’s special treatment. See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 508 U.S. 908 (1993); Smith v. NCAA,
119 S.Ct. 170 (1998) (each denying certiorari). In fact, the Supreme Court’s more recent inaction leading
up to Alston could also be seen as forecasting its eventual anti-NCAA decision, as it had denied certiorari
to the NCAA in their appeal of the unfavorable O’Bannon. NCAA v. O’Bannon, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2015)
(denying certiorari).
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legislation.203 And, outside of the baseball exemption trilogy, the
Supreme Court has commented on and affirmed its existence several
times in declining to extend it to other sports and related activities—
including Alston itself.204
To this end, Alston and other cases which declined to extend the
baseball exemption to other sports only serve to strengthen the baseball
exemption even more. For instance, while Nostalgia Partners seeks to
position Alston’s mention of the baseball exemption as the Court having
“signaled its willingness to reconsider the application and scope of the
baseball exemption recognized in Federal Baseball,”205 that reading of
Alston is almost certainly not what Alston majority opinion author Justice
Gorsuch had in mind.206 A better read of the applicable Alston language
is that rather than “signal[ing] [the Court’s] willingness” to reconsider the
baseball exemption, Justice Gorsuch was instead adding Alston to the
chorus of cases that have acknowledged the baseball exemption’s
interminable but anomalous positioning, declining to overturn it but also
declining to extend similar immunity to other sports. Justice Gorsuch’s
specific language seemingly confirms this, as he never actually criticized
Federal Baseball as bad legal doctrine; rather, he simply distinguished
Alston from it on the basis that “this Court has already recognized that the
NCAA itself is subject to the Sherman Act”—while noting—as many
have before him—that treating baseball differently is “‘unrealistic’ and
‘inconsistent’ and ‘aberration[al].’”207
CONCLUSION
If nothing else, the latest challenge to the baseball exemption is
intriguing. The legal avenue proposed towards limiting or even
eliminating the now century-old judicial anomaly does well to combine

203. Federal Baseball v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346
U.S. 356 (1953); Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012)).
204. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (holding that the baseball exemption does not
apply to the production of theatrical attractions and operating theaters while declining to overturn the
exemption’s applicability to baseball); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U. S. 236 (1955)
(holding that the baseball exemption does not apply to professional boxing while declining to overturn
the exemption’s applicability to baseball); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445 (1957)
(holding that the baseball exemption does not apply to professional football while declining to overturn
the exemption’s applicability to baseball).
205. Complaint, Nostalgia Partners, supra note 1, at 3. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying
text.
206. Especially when recalling that Justice Gorsuch wrote of Federal Baseball’s “distinguished”
nature while on the Tenth Circuit. Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, 814 F. 3d 1129, 1150 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
207. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2159 (2021).
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old cracks in the exemption’s armor with the rationale that much more
recently led to another sports league’s claim to similar immunity being
shut down utterly and completely.
However, when faced with a hurdle as well-established yet irrationallypreserved as the baseball exemption, intriguing is almost certainly not
enough. Fascinating comparisons exist between the Alston decision and
any potential new challenge to the baseball exemption, but the fact
remains that the baseball exemption has endured similar attacks in its onehundred-year history. Moreover, despite strong arguments made by
scholars,208 district court judges,209 and even the late Justice Stevens210
that the Curt Flood Act was not intended to codify the baseball exemption,
recent precedent has firmly established the contrary without disruption by
the Supreme Court.211
As Alston demonstrates, there is undoubtedly room for the Supreme
Court to reverse itself based on the shifting “market realities” of
professional baseball since Federal Baseball in 1922—and even since
Flood in 1972.212 But there is simply no evidence that the Court will do
so. After all, the Court noted similar shifting market realities in Flood,
and yet still left the exemption intact due to Congress’s “positive inaction”
in regard to limiting or removing the exemption themselves. 213 To that
end, nothing has changed. So, as we celebrate Federal Baseball’s onehundredth birthday in 2022, absent what can only be deemed shocking
circumstances, we can only assume that the next one hundred years will
feature similar special treatment for baseball under the antitrust laws—
regardless of Alston and of that special treatment’s well-noted
“‘unrealistic’ and ‘inconsistent’ and ‘aberration[al]’” nature.214

208. See, e.g., Grow, supra note 114; Marianne McGettigan, The Curt Flood Act of 1998: The
Players' Perspective, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 379 (1999).
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